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JURISDICTIONAL AND ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS 
IN THE REGULATION OF THE 
NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 
JlICHAEL BOTELN° 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At least four new telecommunications technologies-cable tele-
vision, multipoint distribution service (MDS), subscription televi-
sion (STV), and direct broadcast satellites (DBS )-promise to 
provide substantially new and perhaps innovative video program-
ming services to consumers. In dealing with these new technologies, 
an initial question for policy planners is whether or not to regulate. 
Two of the many factors in making this type of far-reaching decision 
are the extent of present regulatory jurisdiction and the potential 
impact of the antitrust laws. 
This article attempts to examine the statutory authority of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), as well as the applica-
bility of the antitrust laws to cable, MDS, STV, and DBS. It begins 
by exploring the general scope of the FCC's powers and their appli-
cability to cable, MDS, STV, and DBS. It then moves on to consider 
antitrust policy in relation to communications media, and identifies 
potential antitrust issues. 
This piece is in no way definitive, partially because it considers 
only two aspects of the regulation versus non-regulation issue, and 
partially because the still-developing economic as well as technical 
parameters of these new technologies are still quite unclear. Never-
theless, it is hoped that this preliminary analysis will be of use to 
commentators, the Commission, the Congress, and the courts. 
II. JURISDICTION 
A. Present and Potential Jurisdictional Bases 
At the outset, it may be useful to identify briefly the general 
jurisdictional bases available to the Commission under the Com-
munications Act. It is important to keep in mind that the meaning 
° Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D. 
1969, Cornell University; LL.M. 1972, Columbia University; J.S.D. 1979, Columbia 
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of "jurisdiction" is different in the judicial as opposed to the adminis-
trative context. In the former context, traditional theories of juris-
diction concern courts' powers to adjudicate particular types of 
disputes; a court's power to impose particular types of requirements 
on parties involves remedial rather than jurisdictional considerations. 
In the latter context, however, jurisdiction encompasses not only an 
agency's power to exercise authority over regulated entities, but 
also the type of regulatory requirements which an agency may im-
pose. For example, the Commission's jurisdiction over broadcasters 
clearly precludes some types of regulatory requirements-e.g., re-
quiring access time for the public. As used in this discussion, "juris-
diction" thus includes the Commission's power to impose particular 
types of regulatory requirements, as well as its power to impose 
some type of regulation in the first place. 
With these general observations in mind, it may be useful to 
discuss the major sources of the Commission's jurisdiction. There 
are five different permutations and combinations of these sources. 
First, under Title II of the Communications Act,l the Commis-
sion has jurisdiction over "common carriers." The Act prOvides 
comparatively little elucidation of the concept of common carriage, 
since it defines "common carrier" as "a common carrier for hire in 
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate 
or foreign radio transmission of energy."2 Going back to common 
law theories about common carriers-which primarily, of course, 
were railroads and other methods of transportation 3-the basic 
concept is comparatively simple; a common carrier is a firm which 
holds itself out by its business practices or is required by law to 
prOvide transmission services to any properly qualified customer:! 
The most common examples of communications common carriers, of 
course, are telephone and telegraph companies. Although the basic 
notion of common carriage thus is reasonably clear, there are still 
substantial questions as to the appropriate definition of a carrier and 
as to permissible types of regulatory requirements for carriers.1l 
Second, the Commission has jurisdiction under Title III 0 of the 
Act over use of "any apparatus for the transmission of energy or 
communications or signals by radio"7 in interstate or foreign com-
merce. The effect of this grant of jurisdiction is to allow the Com-
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1976). 
2. Id. § 153(h). 
3. E.g., United States v. California, 2fJ7 U.S. 175 (1936). 
4. See text accompanying note 69 infra. 
5. See text accompanying notes 59-61 irifra. 
6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (1976). 
7. Id. § 301. 
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mission to regulate any use of the radio frequency spectrum for 
over-the-air transmission; for example, the Commission does not have 
Title III jurisdiction over cable television because it does not use 
over-the-air transmissions.8 
The Commission's Title III jurisdiction in turn breaks down 
into three distinct subcatagories. The most visible type, naturally, 
is jurisdiction over broadcast stations, and Title III contains special 
provisions applicable only to them.9 In addition, however, a license 
is necessary under Title III for any Title II common carrier-such 
as a microwave relay station-which uses over-the-air radio trans-
missions; as a result, the Commission regulates many media under 
both Title II and Title III.10 In addition, Title III gives the Commis-
sion jurisdiction over spectrum uses which are neither common 
carriers under Title II, nor broadcasters under the relevant provi-
sions of Title IIIP A common example of this jurisdiction is regula-
tion of citizens band operators.12 
Finally, the Commission has a vaguely defined type of implied 
or residual jurisdiction over activities which do not fall squarely 
within either Title II or Title III. Perhaps the most striking example 
of this to date has been the Commission's "reasonably ancillary" 
jurisdiction over cable televisionY Although the extent of this juris-
diction is open to question, it apparently does not expand any other 
grant of jurisdiction under Title II or Title III; instead, it solely 
confers jurisdiction where no Title II or Title III jurisdiction exists 
in the first place. 
In regulating cable, STY, MDS, and DBS, the Commission has 
used all of these jurisdictional bases. It has regulated cable under 
the "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction recognized by the courts.14 On 
the other hand, STY has been regulated as a Title III broadcaster,I5 
while MDS has been regulated as a Title II common carrier.16 And 
the Commission apparently would be free to regulate DBS as a 
common carrier, broadcaster, or non-carrier non-broadcaster use of 
the radio spectrum.17 As will be seen, .the reasons behind these 
differing regulatory regimes often are somewhat less than clear. 
8. See text accompanying note 21 infra. 
9. E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 311,315,317 (1976). 
10. E.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Co. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 
1963). 
11. E.g., National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
12. 47 C.F.R. § 95.401 et seq. (1979). 
13. See teAt accompanying note 21 infra. 
14. Id. 
15. See text accompanying note 46 infra. 
16. See teAt accompanying note 56 infra. 
17. See teAt accompanying notes 66-83 infra. 
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B. Jurisdiction Over Cable Television 
Cable television distributes programming through a system of 
coaxial cables, rather than over-the-air. It offers two main types of 
service: "basic" and "pay" (with the recent proliferation of pro-
gramming supplied by domestic satellites, some cable systems have 
chosen to market their services under. a system of three or more 
tiers). Basic service usually includes locally receivable signals, "dis-
tant signals" not otherwise available over-the-air, a limited amount 
of locally Originated programming, and time, news, and weather 
information. Pay channels cannot be received without a special filter 
or converter supplied by the cable operator. Virhlally all pay cable 
programming presently is distributed on a national basis through 
common carrier communication satellites. Traditionally, pay cable 
has consisted mainly of an additional "premium" channel of recently 
released motion pictures, current sporting events, and a few special 
productions. More recently, pay cable programmers have begun to 
offer a variety of more speCialized services, such as children's pro-
gramming and continuous news coverage. Since the equipment nec-
essary for per program charges still is not readily or inexpensively 
available, operators either bill subscribers a Hat monthly fee for a 
particular service or pay program distributors a charge of between 
five and twenty-five cents per month for a particular service and 
then pass the cost on to all subscribers.18 
To a very real extent, a pay cable operation thus is quite similar 
to the notion of "community reception" used by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU);lO the main difference, of course, 
is that the programming is provided by already existing common 
carrier communications satellites in the 4/6 GHz band, rather than 
by broadcasting satellites in the 12/14 GHz band. Since the lTV's 
classifications have no legal effect on domestic regulatory schemes, 
however, they do not restrict the Commission's policy in any way.20 
Until recently, the Commission's jurisdiction over cable televi-
sion seemed comparatively clear. Because it does not use over-the-
18. NETWORK INQumy SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
PRELIMINARY REpORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS (Aug. 1979) app. 
Recent Trends in Cable Television Related to the Prospects for New Television Net-
works [hereinafter cited as Recent Trends in Cable Television]. 
19. ITU Resolution S4 APB, Spa 2 defines "community reception" as "the re-
ception of emissions from a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service by 
receiving equipment, which in some cases may be complex and have antennae 
larger than those used in individual reception, and intended for use • . • through 
a distribution system covering a limited area." 
20. Rutkowski, International Data Transfer, Satellite Communication and the 
1979 World Administrative Radio Conference, THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION 
ORDER 3 (1979). 
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air radio frequency transmission, cable does not fall within Title III; 
and the courts have sustained the Commission's refusal to regulate 
cable as a common carrier under Title II. The original Communica-
tions Act contained no mention of cable television, largely because 
cable existed only in highly experimental form in 1934. Nevertheless, 
the courts consistently have interpreted the Act to support at least 
limited Commission regulation. In United States v. Southwestern 
Cable CO.,21 the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's issuance 
of an order to comply with the Commission's 1966 rules.22 These 
rules restricted the number of signals which a cable system could 
"import" from outside its local area and required "exclusivity" for 
local network stations. The Court did not pass upon the validity of 
the specific rules, but instead spoke somewhat vaguely about the 
scope of the Commission's jurisdiction: 
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits 
of the Commission's authority to regulate CATV. It is 
enough to emphasize that the authority which we recog-
nize today under § 152 ( a) is restricted to that reasonably 
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's 
various responsibilities for the regulation of television 
broadcasting.23 
This less than precise language naturally touched off a debate over 
the meaning of "reasonably ancillary."2-! Several years after South-
western Cable, a plurality of the Court seemed to broaden the scope 
of the "reasonably ancillary" test. In United States v. Midwest 
Video Corp. (Midwest 1),25 the Court found that the Commission 
had jurisdiction to require cable systems with 3,500 or more sub-
scribers to "originate" a substantial amount of local programming. 
The four-person plurality's test was whether a regulation fulfilled 
"objectives for which the Commission's regulatory power over 
CATV might properly be exercised."2G The plurality opinion noted 
almost casually that "the Commission's legitimate concern in the 
regulation of CATV is not limited to controlling the competitive 
impact CATV might have on broadcast services."27 Indeed, the 
plurality indicated that the Commission had jurisdiction to impose 
regulations which enhanced services provided by cable as well as 
21. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
22. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101 et seq. (1971). 
23. 392 U.S. at 178. 
24. Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 456 (1972). 
25. 406 U.S. 649 (1972). 
26. ld. at 661. 
27. ld. at 664. 
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which protected broadcast television from cable.28 In concurring 
and providing a fifth vote in favor of the Commission's jurisdiction, 
however, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[c]andor requires ac-
lmowledgment, for me at least, that the Commission's position strains 
the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction 
that has evolved by decisions of the Commission and the Courts."20 
Most recently, the Court may have contracted the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II),30 
the Court held that the Commission lacked statutory jurisdiction to 
require cable television systems with 3,500 or more subscribers to 
offer "access" channels for use by the public. The access channel 
rules required operators to set aside channels for public use on a 
"first-come, nondiscriminatory" basis, maintain basic production 
equipment, and have a minimum channel capability.31 The extent 
to which the Court actually relied upon and narrowed the "reason-
ably ancillary" test is less than clear. Although the Court recited the 
Southwestern formulation,32 it appeared to rely mainly upon section 
153(h) of the Communications Act.33 Section 153(h) prOvides that 
"a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such 
person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier."34 The majority 
reasoned that an access scheme was a carrier-type regulation, since 
it deprived a cable operator of control over program conten~G-con­
trol which a broadcaster normally exercises and which a carrier 
normally does not.sa 
As Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion pOinted out, the language 
of section 153(h) seems to be definitional in nature.37 Nevertheless, 
the majority interpreted that language to prohibit the imposition of 
carrier requirements upon either a broadcaster or cable operator, 
and concluded that the access rules unduly limited cable operators' 
control over programming on their systems.38 At the same time, the 
Court was careful to distinguish its result from that in Midwest I, 
on the ground that the origination rule at issue there did not go as 
far as the access rules. The Court noted that the origination rule 
"did not abrogate the cable operators' control over the composition 
2S. ld. at 664-65. 
29. ld. at 676. 
30. 440 U.S. 6S9 (1979). Chief Justice Burger voted with the majority. 
31. 47 C.F.R. § 76.252 (1979). 
32. 440 U.S. at 706-0S. 
33. ld. at 699-70S. 
34. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976). 
35. 440 U.S. at 701-04. 
36. ld. (construing CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973». 
37. 440 U.S. at 709-10. 
3S. ld. at 705-0S. 
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of their programming, as do the access rules. It compelled operators 
only to assume a more positive role in that regard, one comparable 
to that fulfilled by television broadcasters."39 
The breadth of the FCC's jurisdiction over cable thus is un-
clear in the wake of Midwest II. The opinion is subject to at least 
three different interpretations. First, the Court may have relied 
upon section 153 (h) in order to narrow its holding to invalidate 
only "access" schemes which impinge upon the "journalistic discre-
tion" of cable operators; after all, the Court consistently has been 
hostile to access requirements for either broadcasting or print me-
dia.40 If this is the case, the Commission presumably retains sub-
stantial jurisdiction over cable-including areas such as cross-
ownership, reply time under the fairness or equal opportunities 
doctrine, equal employment opportunity, and the like-as long as 
it steers clear of any type of access scheme. 
Second, Midwest II may contract the Commission's jurisdic-
tion substantially, by allowing only Southwestern-type regulation 
to protect television broadcasting. This assumes that the Court 
meant not only to invoke section 153(h), but also to reduce the 
Midwest I plurality's expansive opinion. If this is the case, the Com-
mission presumably would have jurisdiction only to impose rules 
such as limitations on distant signals and requirements of non-
duplication by programming on distant signals.41 This approach 
seems to depart from the D.C. Circuit Court's holding in Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.42 The court there held that the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction did not include economic protection of -broad-
casters through "anti-siphoning" restrictions on cable systems' use 
of movies, sports, and series programming. 
This interpretation also raises the further question as to whether 
the Commission would have jurisdiction to protect other new media 
-such as STY, MDS, or DBS-against competition from cable. 
To the extent that Southwestern turned just on protection of broad-
casters, STY and DBS might have some type of claim for protec-
tion as broadcasters; to the extent that the "reasonably ancillary" 
test contemplated a preferred position only for media with mass 
audiences, however, it probably would not apply to STY or DBS 
pay operations. 
Third, the Court may have meant not only to apply section 
153(h), but also to cut back "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction. 
39. ld. 699-700. 
40. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); 
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
41. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.61, 76.92-.94 (1979). 
42. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerro denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
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If this is the case, the Commission obviously would be unable to 
impose either access schemes or requirements unrelated to protec-
tion of broadcast television-such as prohibitions on cross-owner-
ship or employment discrimination. 
Finally, with the aid of 20-20 hindsight, it appears that other 
jurisdictional bases may exist for FCC regulation of cable-i.e., 
the FCC's jurisdiction over microwave relays and earth stations 
used by cable systems. Indeed, in its very first assertion of juris-
diction over cable, the Commission relied upon cable systems' use 
of microwave relay facilities; it required cable operators to comply 
with signal carriage and exclusivity rules as a condition of receiving 
microwave relay licenses43 under Title III. This approach had been 
upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court in Carter Mountain Transmission 
Co. v. FCC,44 which sustained the Commission's exercise of its 
jurisdiction against both statutory and first amendment claims. 
Ironically, comparatively few cable television systems made use 
of microwave relays at that time. Almost all sizeable cable systems 
today, however, use either microwave relays or receive-only earth 
stations to receive distant signals or pay programming. Microwave 
relays require a Title III license, as did earth stations until re-
cently.45 Regardless of the result in Midwest II, the Commission 
may be able to use its Title III jurisdiction over microwave relays 
and its dormant jurisdiction over earth stations to impose condi-
tions upon cable systems which use them. 
C. Jurisdiction Over Subscription Televi8ion 
STV is another method of transmitting programs to viewers 
on a pay basis. Under the present regulations, stations operating on 
frequencies listed in the television Table of Assignments may use 
some airtime for pay programming, as long as they also broadcast 
the FCC's minimum percentages of non-pay programming required 
by the Rules.46 Since almost all VHF allocations already are in 
use,47 STY operators de facto are required to apply for UHF licenses 
or acquire stations already licensed to UHF broadcasters. STY thus 
differs from both MDS and DBS, since it is receivable in the viewer's 
home on an ordinary all-channel television set, \vithout any need 
for a converter to translate MDS's 2.1 GHz or DBS's 12 GHz Signals 
43. First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C.2d 683 (1965). 
44. 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
45. Report and Order, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979). 
46. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1980). 
47. As of the time of this writing, all assignments for VHF stations were either 
in use or granted. BROADCASTING, Nov. 12, 1979, at 87. 
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into a VHF television signal which a conventional set can receive. 
Precisely because STY signals can be received on a conventional 
television set, however, STY operators "scramble" their program-
ming before transmission and supply a "descrambler" to subscribers 
in order to exclude any "free riders." Most STV programming con-
sists of movies or sports, and is quite similar to "premium" service 
provided by pay cable operators.48 
Precisely because STY is a broadcast use within Title III of 
the Communications Act, the Commission has the same jurisdiction 
over it as over any other type of broadcaster. As early as 1962, the 
D.C. Circuit Court once again upheld the Commission's jurisdic-
tion over experimental STY broadcasts by a Hartford, Connecticut 
station; it noted, however, that in a permanent system of STV" 
stations, claims of adverse economic impact pOSSibly might be rele-
vant.40 After the Commission finally adopted rules authOrizing the 
licensing of STY stations in 1968, the D.C. Circuit Court once 
again upheld the Commission's jurisdiction against arguments that 
STV did not fall within the Communications Act and that the 
Commission had acted arbitrarily. In National Association of The-
atre Owners v. FCC (NATO),50 the court indicated, however, that 
the Commission might have-and be required-to exert ratemaking 
authority over STV, even though STY was a Title III operation. 
Then-Judge Burger noted that "if and when the premises of its 
regulatory approach change, the Commission can and should con-
sider the [ratemaking] issues involved."51 To the extent that rate-
making involves exclusively carrier-type regulation, and to the ex-
tent that Midwest II prohibits any carrier-type regulation of broad-
casters, the NATO holding may no longer be relevant. Nevertheless, 
the Commission may need to face at some point the question as to 
whether it has, and should exercise, jurisdiction over STY rates. 
Finally, STY's status as a Title III broadcaster may raise some 
questions as to the Commission's jurisdiction over it vis-a-vis cable, 
MDS, and DBS. The Commission arguably might have jurisdiction 
to protect STY against economic impact from cable under even a 
very narrow "reasonably ancillary" test. On the other hand, the 
48. For a complete discussion of economic, technical, and engineering aspects 
of STV, see K. Glen, Report on Subscription TeleVision, App. to NETWORK INQUIRY 
SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY REpORT ON 
PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SubScription 
Television]. See also text accompanying note 18 supra. 
49. Connecticut Committee Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 
1962). 
50. 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). 
51. ld. at 203. 
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relationship between STV and DBS would be less clear if DBS 
also were regulated as a Title III broadcaster. Although STV and 
DBS obviously use different types of technology, both might be 
broadcasters. The FCC might have a duty to deny a license to 
either an STV or a DBS operator if a new station would have suf-
ficient economic impact upon an existing station to deny the public 
of significant service. 52 To a lesser extent, the Commission might 
even need to consider the economic impact on broadcasters of 
licensing DBS as a common carrier.53 Indeed, there is at least lim-
ited . doctrinal support for holding that cable systems are entitled 
to protection from electrical interference caused by broadcasters.U4 
D. Jurisdiction Over Multipoint Distl'ibution Service 
MDS systems operate on one of two channels available at 2150-
2162 MHz, much higher frequencies than STV stations on UHF 
bands. Like cable, STV and DBS, MDS can distribute pay pro-
gramming. Unlike STV, it does not operate on frequencies which 
can be received by conventional television sets; as a result, MDS 
viewers require a converter to translate signals from 2150-2162 
MHz to an appropriate VHF channel,55 MDS is regulated by the 
FCC as a common carrier under Title II of the Act.uG The Com-
mission has not imposed upon MDS, however, a full range of com-
mon carrier obligations; instead, the only two significant carrier-type 
requirements are that the MDS operator not be "substantially in-
volved" in program production, and that the MDS system not sup-
ply more than fifty percent of its services to entities "affiliated with 
or related to" it.57 
52. E.g., Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). For 
an excellent discussion of the Commission' 5 economic impact doctrine, see Mayer, 
Sanders Brothers Revisited: Protection of Broadcasters from the Consequences of 
Economic Competition, 49 Ky. L.J. 370 (1961). 
53. E.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 362 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963). 
54. H&B Communications Corp. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
55. For a complete discussion of the economic, technical, and legal aspects of 
MDS, see K. Glen, Report on Multipoint Distribution Service, App. to NETWORK IN-
QUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PRELIl\UNARY RE-
PORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Multipoint Distribution Service]. 
56. 47 C.F.R. § 21.900 (1979) provides that "[a]uthorizations for stations in 
this [MDS] service will be granted to existing and proposed communications com-
mon carriers." The Commission apparently made no conscious decision to regulate 
MDS as a carrier rather than as a broadcaster or other pure Title III use; it seemed 
to assume that MDS was a carrier because it would use frequencies preViously as-
signed to carriers. Report and Order, 29 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 382 (1974). 
57. 47 C.F.R. § 21.903(b)(1), (2) (1979). 
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To a very real extent, the Commission's MDS jurisdiction is a 
mirror image of its STY jurisdiction. Just as the Commission has 
authority over STY under Title III, it can impose any type of tra-
ditional common carrier regulation on MDS under Title II. The 
only real outer limit of the Commission's authority would involve 
whether or not it had properly classified MDS as a carrier in the 
first place; there may be at least some limited authority for this 
argument.u8 
E. Jurisdiction Ove?' Direct Broadcast Satellites 
Direct broadcast satellites move in a geosynchronous orbit 
around the earth, allowing them to stay in the same place in space 
in relation to the earth.a9 They thus provide the functional equiva-
lent of an antenna 22,300 miles in space. Depending upon its an-
tenna configuration and its power, a direct broadcast satellite can 
cover an area ranging in size from one time zone in the United 
States to almost half of the earth.GO Since spaces for satellites in the 
geosynchronous orbit are limited, it still is not clear how many DBS 
signals might be available in the United States on either a national 
or a regional basis. Although only time and technology will tell, 
it seems safe to assume that at least three or four DBS signals 
could be available in any part of the nation.61 
Most DBS services probably will be oriented, at least at the 
beginning, toward pay programming for several reasons. First, the 
necessity of a separate converter in order to receive DBS programs 
on a conventional television set makes it easy to ration-and thus 
charge for-DBS programming. Second, in the only firm proposal 
to date, COMSAT has proposed a system of pay programming.62 
Third, national and international copyright considerations may re-
quire limitations on the scope of DBS tranmissions.63 
Perhaps the most important fact about DBS is simply that it 
does not exist at the present time, and probably will not exist for 
a number of years. Since DBS has not developed into a de facto 
broadcaster or carrier, the Commission has a comparatively free 
5B. See text accompanying notes 66-79 infra. 
59. See New York Law School Communications Clinic, The Development of 
Video Technology, 25 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 7B9 (19BO) [hereinafter cited as Technology]. 
60. See Technology, supra note 59, at BI0. 
61. See Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints 
and Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. B13 (19BO) [hereinafter cited as Direct 
Broadcast Satellites]. 
62. See Direct Broadcast Satellites, supra note 61, at B12. 
63. E. Samuels, Copyright and the New Communications Technologies, 25 
N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 905 (19BO) [hereinafter cited as Copyright]. 
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hand in deciding which regulatory regime to impose. In very basic 
terms, the Commission probably has the discretion to regulate DBS 
as a common carrier, a broadcaster or even a hybrid of the two. 
A communications entity's status depends largely upon how it 
actually operates, of course, and at this point DBS is not in oper~ 
ation. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the Commission un~ 
questionably has some form of jurisdiction over DBS. Regardless of 
how it operates, DBS clearly will use over-the-air radio frequency 
transmissions. As a result, a DBS operation would involve "the 
transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio" in 
interstate commerce.64 This transmission would invoke Title III 
jurisdiction of one kind or another.61; The real question before the 
Commission then would be whether to regulate DBS as a broad~ 
caster under Title III, a carrier under Title II and Title III, or a 
non-broadcast non-carrier under Title III. 
1. Regulation as a Common Carrier 
One approach would be to view DBS Simply as a point-to-multi~ 
point common carrier. The status of DBS as a carrier would hinge 
on whether DBS operators control just the hardware, or both the 
hardware and the software. The basic test would be whether DBS 
operators hold out-or are required to hold out-their facilities for 
non-diSCriminatory use by the public or any reasonable class of 
the public. In light of the difficulty of predicting future directions 
for DBS development, this is very much a gray area of the law.60 
As at least one commentator has noted,67 characterization of 
DBS as a point-to-multipoint carrier at least potentially could fit 
traditional definitions of common carriage. Mter all, the vagueness 
of the concept is reHected in the Commission's rules, which define 
a «communication common carrier" as «any person engaged in ren~ 
dering communication service for hire to the public."68 The District 
of Columbia Circuit Court, however, recently has added a sub-
stantial gloss to the definitions in both the Communications Act 
and the rules. 
64. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). 
65. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
66. For a consideration of the ITU's differences between "fixed" and "broadcast," 
see H. AlaMA, P.M. McMANAMON & P.I. WELLS, FL\,:ED SATELLITE AND BROADCAST-
ING-SATELLITE SERVICE CONSIDERATIONS FOR 1979 GWARC PLANNING 19-20 (1978). 
67. G. SKALL & K. SHAEFER, DIRECT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC BROADCAST-
ING BY SATELLITE-A MYTH OR POTENTIAL REALITY 9-10 (1978). 
68. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1979). 
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In National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
v. FCC (N ARUC 1),60 the District of Columbia Circuit Court con-
sidered whether or not the Commission could assign frequencies 
for communications entities to provide services to third parties, but 
not regulate them as common carriers. At issue was the Commis-
sion's allocation of UHF frequencies to "specialized mobile radio 
systems" (SMRS), which then could render limited service to spec-
ified categories of third parties. SMRS operators were private, for-
profit entities, but were not regulated as carriers. The court held 
that ,the Commission had classified SMRSs properly as non-carriers. 
In defining the notion of common carriage, the court noted that: 
Whether the common carrier concept is invoked to sup-
port strict tort liability or as a justifying basis for regula-
.tion, it appears that the critical point is the quasi-public 
character of the activity involved .... What appears to be 
essential to the quasi-public character implicit in the com-
mon carrier concept is that the carrier "undertakes to carry 
for all people indifferently . . . ." This does not mean that 
a given carrier's services must practically be available to 
the entire public. One may be a common carrier though 
the nature of the service rendered is sufficiently specialized 
as to be of possible use to only a fraction of the total popu-
lation. And business may be turned away either because 
it is not of the type normally accepted or because the car-
rier's capacity has been exhausted. But a carrier will not 
be a common carrier where its practice is to make indi-
vidualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on 
what terms to deal.70 
The court specifically did not pass on the issue of whether the 
Commission's Title II powers were "mandatory or discretionary"71 
-i.e., whether the Commission deliberately could classify a de facto 
carrier as a non-carrier or vice versa. 
Just a few months after NARUC I, the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court had an opportunity to reflect upon this test in a simi-
larly captioned case, National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners 'C. FCC (NARUC 11).72 In NARUC II, the court 
undertook to expand its definition of a common carrier to include 
'~the requirement formulated by the FCC and with particular ap-
69. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cen. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). 
70. ld. at 641 (footnotes omitted). 
71. ld. at 640 nA8. 
72. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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plicability to the communications field, that the system be such that 
customers ~transmit intelligence of their own design and choos-
ing.' ''73 In reality, this second test seems to add very little to the 
definition of a common carrier; a communications entity hardly is 
"available to the public" if it does not allow its customers to con-
trol their messages. 
Under the District of Columbia Circuit Court's analyses in both 
NARUC I and NARUC II, a communications entity can be either 
a de jure or a de facto carrier. As the court noted in NARUC I, 
"we must inquire, first, whether there will be any legal compulsion 
thus to serve indifferently, and if not, second, whether there are 
reasons implicit in the nature of [the entity's] operations to expect 
an indifferent holding out to the eligible user public."14 
It is less than clear whether this gives the Commission broad dis-
cretion in deciding whether to classify an entity such as a DBS system 
as a carrier or a broadcaster. In NARUC I, the court noted that "a 
particular system is a common carrier by virtue of its functions, 
rather than because it is declared to be SO."10 Moreover, Midwest 
1[16 seems to hold that the Commission may not impose carrier-type 
requirements upon a communications entity which functions as a 
broadcaster. These positions would indicate that the Commission 
may not transform a de facto non-carrier into a de jure carrier. On 
the other hand, NARUC I also gave at least some weight to de jure 
factors in terms of "legal compulsion."11 And more than a decade 
before the NARUC cases, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
had held that the Commission had substantial discretion in deciding 
whether to classify cable television as a common carrier. In Phila-
delphia Television Broadcasting Company v. FCC,78 the court noted 
that "the agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing which juris-
dictional base and which regulatory tools will be most effective in 
advancing the Congressional objective" of diversity-a position 
which the Ninth Circuit later endorsed.70 
It is thus unclear whether the Commission would have the 
discretion to regulate DBS as a common carrier. Since DBS oper-
ations are not likely to be in place for a number of years, how-
ever, the Commission probably has a free hand to turn DBS oper-
73. Id. at 609 (footnote omitted). 
74. 525 F.2d at 642. 
75. rd. at 624 (footnote omitted). 
76. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
77. 525 F.2d at 642. 
78. 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
79. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975) (held that the Commission 
had not abused its discretion in refusing to classify cable systems as common carriers). 
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ations into de jure common carriers at this still comparatively early 
stage. Although the Commission presumably could not force a 
broadcasting operation to fit the mold of a carrier, DBS has yet 
to develop in any discernable direction. 
2. Regulation as a Broadcaster 
Just as a DBS operation might take the form of point-to-multi-
point communications and resemble a common carrier, a single en-
tity might control both the software as well as the hardware, and 
thus resemble a broadcaster. As noted above, the use by DBS of 
the radio spectrum clearly would bring it within some type of 
Title III jurisdiction. If DBS were not an over-the-air common 
carrier under both Title II and Title III, it might be either a broad-
caster or a non-carrier non-broadcast spectrum use under Title III. 
As discussed before, the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Na-
tional Association of Theatte Ownets held that STY stations were 
broadcast operations under Title III of the Act.80 Since DBS and 
STY have the same potential audiences and differ only in the fre-
quencies used, there should be little difficulty in classifying a DBS 
operation as a broadcast station as long as it has the necessary control 
over programming. 
There does not appear to be any case law on the distinction 
between a broadcaster and a non-broadcaster non-carrier spectrum 
use under Title III. By analogy to Midwest II, however, the defini-
tion would appear to be functional in nature; after all, the Court 
there focused on cable systems' program content control in holding 
that they were as exempt as broadcasters from carrier-type regula-
lation.81 Under this type of analysis, the status of DBS presumably 
would depend upon the extent to which it developed-or, perhaps, 
was allowed to develop-control over programming decisions. 
3. Regulation as a Hybrid 
Finally, the Commission presumably could regulate DBS as a 
non-broadcaster non-carrier spectrum use under Title III, unless 
DBS had developed into a de facto broadcaster or carrier in the ab-
sence of regulation. This status would make DBS analogous to the 
SMRS operators in NARUC 1.82 
The main question as to this regulatory approach would be 
the extent to which the Commission could impose "hybrid" re-
BO. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
B1. See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
B2. See teJ.:t accompanying note 68 supra. 
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quirements on DBS-i.e., a combination of broadcaster and car-
rier obligations. For example, the Commission might decide to re-
quire a DBS operator to provide some channels on a common carrier 
basis and to allow it to program others itself-a situation some-
what akin to the 50/50 rule for MDS.83 
NARUC I certainly indicates that the Commission may allow 
a non-broadcaster non-carrier spectrum use under Title III to have 
some attributes of a carrier; it does not make clear, however, 
whether the Commission may impose a mixture of broadcaster and 
carrier obligations. Midwest II seems to hold that the Commission 
may not impose carrier-type regulations upon a de facto broad-
caster; it does not address, however, the question of whether 
the Commission may either impose broadcaster-style obligations 
on a carrier or use a mixture of broadcaster-type and carrier-type 
regulations. Under both cases, the actual functioning of the medium 
in question seems significant and perhaps even determinative. Once 
again, this reinforces the theory that the Commission would have a 
freer hand in choosing a jurisdictional regulatory scheme now than 
after DBS has developed. 
F. Conclusion 
The Commission has a wide variety of present and potential 
jurisdictional bases over cable, STY, MDS, and DBS. MDS is sub-
ject to Title II; STY is subject to Title III; cable television is sub-
ject to "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction; and DBS might be subject 
to any of three different jurisdictional bases. There does not seem 
to be any compelling policy reason for these distinctions; they ap-
pear to be historical accidents rather than historical inevitabilities. 
Particularly in light of the current pressure for some type of 
"rewrite" of the Communications Act, the Commission might wish 
to seek new legislation to provide a cohesive approach to regula-
tion of new technologies. All of the currently pending bills would 
reduce the Commission's jurisdiction over cable television, except as 
to narrowly and perhaps idiosyncratically defined exceptions.84 STY 
apparently would fare the same as other television broadcasters, 
with no Commission jurisdiction to regulate its pay features sepa-
rately.85 MDS might be almost completely beyond the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, to the extent that it has been deemed to be 
83. See teli.1: accompanying note 57 supra. 
84. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 332 (1979) would allow the Commission 
to regulate cable only in order to protect broadcasting from economic harm. See also 
H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 321(b)(1) (1979). 
85. E.g., S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 335 (1979). 
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subject to the ordinary play of "marketplace" forces.86 And DBS 
would be regulable either as a common carrier-to the extent that 
the Commission retained its traditional common carrier jurisdiction 
-or as a broadcaster.87 
As discussed above, the Commission has not attempted to base 
its jurisdiction over cable, STY or MDS on any internally con-
sistent, logical construct. The formulations in currently pending 
legislative proposals, however, do not seem to fare much better. 
III. ANTITRUST 
A. Introduction 
The goal of the antitrust laws is to prohibit conduct which 
directly or indirectly forecloses entry into and competition within 
any type of economic "market."88 Courts and agencies thus rely to 
a large extent upon economic evidence in enforcing the antitrust 
laws. Precisely because of the often vague nature of this data,89 
the courts' decisions in antitrust cases are somewhat ad hoc in na-
ture. Nevertheless, by way of generalization, it is possible to iden-
tify three main categories of antitrust violations: horizontal agree-
ments, vertical agreements, and structural restraints. 
Because horizontal agreements commonly involve agreements 
among competitors to create a protected market for themselves, 
they usually are classified as "per se" violations. Under this mode 
of analYSiS, proof of an agreement alone is sufficient to establish a 
violation of the antitrust laws, without proof of any economic ef-
fect.90 Vertical agreements and structural restraints, on the other 
hand, do not necessarily foreclose entry and may have valid busi-
ness purposes. As a result, they usually are subject to a "rule of 
. reason" rather than a "per se" analYSis, and require a showing that 
a defendant's conduct had an anticompetitive impact and lacked any 
business justification.91 
86. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301 et seq. (1979); S. 622 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 331 et seq. (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 451 et seq. (1979). 
87. S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 201 et seq. (1979); S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess., § 201 et seq. (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 311 et seq. (1979). 
88. For a discussion of problems in defining a "market," see notes 92-106 and 
accompanying text infra. 
89. See generaUy L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 7-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
SULLIVAN]. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), where the 
Court, faced with an agreement among food retailers to respect certain territorial 
rights allocated by TorcO, stated: "We think that it is clear that the restraint in 
this case is a horizonta one, and, therefore, a per se violation. . .. " ld. at 608. See 
generaUy SULLIVAN, supra note 89, at 7-8. 
91. SULLIVAN, supra note 89, at 182-86. 
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This discussion will review these three general categories of 
violations as applied to cable television, subscription television 
(STV), multipoint distribution service (MDS), and direct broad-
cast satellites (DBS). It will conclude by discussing procedural op-
tions in dividing responsibility for enforcement of the antitrust laws 
between the courts and the Federal Communications Commission. 
B. Market Definition 
Since the antitrust laws are concerned primarily with market 
foreclosure, the mst step in any analysis is to define a relevant 
economic market. In essence, the task involves consideration of two 
separate types of markets: first, a product market, and second, a 
geographic market. 
Defining a product market is important for two reasons. First, 
the more products included in a product market, the larger it be-
comes-and thus the smaller any individual firm's share becomes. 
Second, definition of the product market naturally tends to influ-
ence the definition of the geographic market by impacting on the 
determination as to the relevant products, and thus on the area of 
effective competition among separate firms. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, there is no 
clear or Simple test for deciding what products to include within 
a single product market.o2 The basic notion is functional inter-
changeability of products, as viewed by potential buyers. Theoret-
ical or technical interchangeability is generally irrelevant if buyers 
do not view products as acceptable substitutes for each other.o3 
Since the test of a product market thus focuses on buyers' percep-
tions and understandings, it naturally includes highly subjective 
determinations. To date, there has been virtually no judicial at-
tempt to define product markets for the communications media. 
Several cases have involved monopolization claims against cable 
television operators, on the ground that they had attempted to 
prevent other companies from securing cable television franchises 
in the same area.94 Since most of these actions were dismissed with-
out trial on varying grounds,05 the opinions on appeal are not par-
92. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1964). 
93. See, e.g., E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 377, 
380 (1956). 
94. See, e.g., Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570 
(4th Cir. 1976); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. IDOl (1972). 
95. E.g., Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570 (4th 
Cir. 1976) (claim barred by statute of limitations); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of 
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ticularly enlightening; they seem to assume that there was a relevant 
product market, but do not bother to define it.!lG 
As Professor Bennett has pointed out, however, the relevant 
product markets for the television media might take a number of 
different forms.!l7 In looking at cable, STY, MDS, or DBS, a court 
might hold the relevant product market to be any or all of the 
follOWing: all types of entertainment; all conventional radio and 
television stations; all television stations; all methods for transmit-
ting pay programming; or just one method for transmitting pay 
programming. This analysis naturally considers only pay program-
ming; if any or all of these new media had significant advertiser 
support, all other advertising media-from billboards to local daily 
newspapers-might be included in the relevant product market. 
The Commission basically has not been forced to face these issues 
to date.!l8 The Supreme Court's opinion in FCC v. National Citizens 
Committee for B1'Oadcasting!l!J avoided the issue by holding only 
that the Commission had significant administrative discretion in 
passing on questions of concentration of control; as a result, the 
Commission was not required to order divestiture of locally cross-
owned newspapers and broadcast stations.100 
At the very least, the product market presumably would in-
clude all methods for delivering real-time video programminglOl 
to a viewer. If cable, STY, MDS, and DBS evolved solely into 
methods of delivering "pay" programming, only these media would 
Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (no cause of action under the 
Shennan Act for defendant licensee to make political contributions and misrepresenta-
tions for the purpose of eliminating cable television competitor where these actions 
are legitimate efforts to influence legislative decisionmaking). 
96. Although the Lamb case went to trial and the jury identified the relevant 
line of commerce or product market as "dissemination of news," 461 F.2d at 510, 
the court assumed that the relevant product market was cable television, exclusive 
of other technologies for dissemination. See also Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rock-
ford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). 
97. Bennett, Media Concentration and the FCC: Focusing with a Section Seven 
Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 159 (1971). 
98. See, e.g., Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court 
deferred to the FCC on the question of undue concentration of control of mass 
communication media. The court held that FCC investigations into multiple owner-
ship and resulting concentration were more appropriate than a judicial hearing, 
because rulemakiiig proceedings are more thorough and all interested parties can 
participate. ld. at 560. 
The FCC rules on multiple ownership are contained in 47 C.F.R. § 73.35 (1980) 
(standard broadcast stations); 47 C.F.R. § 73.240 (1980) (FM broadcast stations); 
47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1980) (television broadcast stations). 
99. 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
100. ld. at 810. 
101. "Real time video" programming refers to programs which are transmitted 
without any modification in the rate of data transfer. 
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be relevant. Conventional advertiser-supported television also might 
be relevant, however, if cable, STY, MDS, and DBS did offer adver-
tiser-supported programming.102 In addition, a court might con-
clude that pay and advertiser-supported television compete for the 
same consumers. Under this analysis, conventional television would 
be part of the same product market as cable, STY, MDS, and 
DBS; some consideration also might need to be given to video-
tape recorders and videodisc players, which offer similar program-
ming.103 
As noted above, the choice of a product market plays a large 
role in determining the relevant geographic market. The geographic 
market usually is the area in which a firm sells in active and reason-
ably equal competition with other firms.104 As with product markets, 
however, the Supreme Court has used an ad hoc approach in de-
fining geographic markets. For example, it has held that the rele-
vant geographic market in a section 7105 case might be a state, a 
three-state area, or the whole country. The Court did not attempt 
to single out anyone of the three, and held merely that a merger 
would have suffiCiently anticompetitive impacts in all three areas 
to violate section 7.106 
Thus, there are a number of possible geographic markets for 
a cable system, STY station, MDS operation or DBS system. For 
example, a DBS operation covering the Eastern Standard Time Zone 
might be in the same geographic market not only as other DBS 
operations in that time zone, but also as all cable, MDS, and STY 
operations within the area. 
As a result, any cable system, STY station, MDS operation, or 
DBS operation would have only a comparatively small share of any 
relevant product and geographiC market. To find a substantial market 
share, it probably would be necessary to constrict the product market 
artificially by excluding other media delivering Virtually the same 
programming, and to define the geographiC market as only the area 
served by the operation with the smallest geographical area, i.e., 
one cable television system's service area. 
Once the relevant product and geographic markets are estab-
lished, the next step in any antitrust analysiS would be to inquire 
102. See 47 C.F.R. 73.658 (1979). 
103. Recent Trends in Cable Television, supra note 18, at 91-103. 
104. See, e.g., Merger Guidelines of Dep't of Justice, [1976] 1 TRADE REG. REP. 
( CCH) IT 4510. 
105. A "section 7" case is the common terminology for litigation arising from a 
violation of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version nt 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976». 
106. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). 
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into possible anticompetitive practices. As indicated above, this 
involves consideration of the three aforementioned practices: hori-
zontal agreements, vertical agreements, and structural consider-
ations. 
c. Horizontal Agreements 
As noted above, horizontal agreements among competitors gen-
erally are illegal per se-i.e., without any proof of actual market 
foreclosure-because they have the inherent effect of either driv-
ing out present competitors or preventing potential competitors 
from entering a market.lo1 The classic example of per se illegality 
is price-fixing/os as it forecloses competition among competitors. 
The courts thus have held it illegal per se since the early days of 
antitrust enforcement.109 Division of sales territories by competitors 
is usually also illegal per se, since it gives each seller a protected 
monopoly area in which it does not face price or non-price com-
petitionpo 
On the one hand, outright collusion as to price or non-price 
terms may be unlikely among cable, STV, MDS, or DBS operators 
on a national, regional, or local level. Mter all, the prices and ser-
vices are highly visible by the very fact that these firms market 
107. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. 
108. See United States v. So cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S". 150 (1939). The 
Socony Court said: 
Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and 
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the 
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se. 
Where the machinery for price-fiXing is an agreement on the prices to be 
charged or paid for the commodity in the interstate or foreign channels 
of trade, the power to fix prices exists if the combination has control of a 
substantial part of the commerce in that commodity. Where the means for 
price-fixing are purchases or sales of the commodity in a market operation 
or, as here, purchases of a part of the supply of the commodity for the 
purpose of keeping it from having a depressive effect on the markets, 
such power may be found to exist though the combination does not control 
a substantial part of the commodity. 
ld. at 223-24. 
109. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 
( 1897), where the Court invalidated an agreement among several companies entered 
into for the purpose "of maintaining reasonable rates to be received by each company 
executing the agreement." ld. at 310. 
110. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). In Sealy, the 
Court was faced with an agreement whereby the holders of the "Sealy" trademark 
licensed the use of the name by manufacturers of sleeping products and also allocated 
exclusive territorial marketing rights between the licensees. The Court, in invalidating 
this agreement, wrote that such agreements are "unlawful under §1 of the Sherman 
Act without the necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business 
or economic justification, their impact in the marketplace, or their reasonableness." 
ld. at 357-58. 
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them to the public at large and file rates with federal, state, or local 
regulatory agencies. Any attempt to set rates or services artificially 
thus should be fairly easy to detect. Indeed, the experience to date 
with cable television indicates that there are very substantial varia-
tions in both price and non-price terms. For example, a 1979 study 
of the price of both "basic" and "premium" cable television service 
showed that prices for both services varied as much as one hundred 
percent from system to system.111 To a certain extent, of course, this 
might reflect differences in the systems' costs, which vary greatly 
between urban and rural areas. It also might reflect fears that com-
petitors would apply for franchises upon their expiration. 
On the other hand, while outright collusion among competitors 
may be unlikely, the very visibility of the rate and service structure 
of these media might encourage competitors to set their prices and 
services at roughly the same level in the same geographic area. 
Whether this goes under "conscious parallelism"112 or another ru-
bric, some type of leveling effect may be not only inevitable, but 
also virtually impOSSible to detect. 
Competing manufacturers and operators also might attempt to 
impose uniform technical standards for equipment. This might fore-
close the wholesale or retail market for some equipment suppliers, 
if the standards required use of a product or process which was not 
generally available because of patent protection of necessary pro-
duction equipment. Technical standards also might make a home 
viewer's equipment incompatible with signals from a potentially 
competitive programming source.1l3 Indeed, in the field of DBS, one 
competitor, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T), has pressed for uniform equipment standards for some 
tiroe,114 
The difficulty with equipment standardization, of course, is that 
its goal may be either to stifle competition or to promote efficiency. 
111. Paul Kagan Assocs., Inc., Census as of December 31, 1978 of Pay-Cable 
Systems Operational on September 30, 1978 (1979) (unpublished estimates available 
from Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Carmel, CaL). 
112. Compare Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distribution Corp., 
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) ("Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel oe-
havior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward 
conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman 
Act entirely.") with American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) 
("It is not the form of the combination or the particular means used but the result 
to be achieved that the statute condemns"). 
113. This result would be most likely, of course, if a vertically integrated firm, 
as discussed at notes 132-52 and accompanying text infra, had both equipment 
manufacturing and program distribution capability. 
114. Inquiry Relating to the Preparations for tne 1977 World Administrative Radio 
Conference of the International Telecommunication Union for the Planning of the 
Broadcasting-Satellite Service in the 11.7-12.2 GHz Band, 60 F.C.C.2d 700 (1976). 
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In general, ,the courts have been fairly unsympathetic to standardiza-
tion of professional services, even where it arguably is related to 
safety measures.lU; Similarly, in recent years the Commission has 
attempted to promote interconnection of competitors' equipment 
into the AT&T network.ll6 Thus, in 1975, the Commission prohibited 
AT&T from requiring its prior approval of interconnection equip-
ment, and instead adopted a simple requirement of "registration" 
with the FCC.l17 
Because the consumer markets for cable, STY and MDS have 
been, until recently, relatively small, there has been a natural ten-
dency for only a limited number of major manufacturers to offer 
equipment in these fields. There probably has been little temptation 
to use standardization as an exclUSionary device. Should the new 
technologies grow in the future, however, there might be some im-
petus from major manufacturers for equipment standardization. The 
Commission thus might wish to take affirmative steps to keep these 
markets open for low-cost equipment and thereby encourage new 
entry. 
115. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679 (1978). The Society argued that the restraint on competitive bidding for en-
gineering services contained in its canons was justified under a rule of reason 
analysis since competitive bidding "would lead to deceptively low bids, and would 
thereby tempt individual engineers to do inferior work with consequential risk to 
public safety and health." ld. at 693. 
The Court rejected this analysis: "[T]he Rule [of Reason] does not open the 
field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that 
may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged 
restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Id. at 688. Under the rule of reason 
the restraint is evaluated in terms of the particular circumstances of the industry. 
H the restraint is found to be anticompetitive, arguments that competition is not 
in the public interest are foreclosed. "Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that 
policy decision has been made by the Congress." ld. at 692. 
For the classic definition of the rule of reason, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), where Justice Brandeis discussed the operation of the 
rule in the following manner: 
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. 
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must 
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; 
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history 
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting that 
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant 
facts. 
ld. at 238. 
116. COMPETITION vs. REGULATION: THE CASE OF TIIE MASS MEDIA 99-138 
(M. Botein & S. Robb eds. 1978). 
117. First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593, 616-29 (1975). 
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There may also be some cause for concern about either geo-
graphical or product market division among competitors in at least 
some of these developing industries. To a very real extent, of course, 
some amount of non-collusive territorial exclusivity is inherent in 
some of these new media. For example, the economics of cable 
television usually prohibit "overwiring,"118 and virtually all cable 
franchises accordingly are either de facto or de jure exclusive.110 
Similarly, the Commission's rules did not allow operation of more 
than one STY station to a "community" until very recently,120 and 
the MDS rules allocate only two MDS channels per market.l2l In 
the case of cable, STY, or MDS, economic, technolOgical, or legal 
requirements may require and thus justify varying degrees of geo-
graphiC exclusivity. On the other hand, more than one DBS opera-
tion probably could serve either the entire nation or at least different 
regions of it.122 There thus would be comparatively little justifica-
tion for market division in the DBS field. There are at least two 
possible ways, however, in which DBS operators might impose 
exclusivity. First, competing DBS operators might agree that each 
one of them would provide all DBS service for a particular geo-
graphic area, such as a time zone. Second, they might agree that 
each one of them would have a different national "format"123 to 
appeal to a different national audience. 
Competitors also might agree to boycott potential new entrants 
into their field. For example, several antitrust cases have involved 
claims by a cable television operator that other cable television op-
erators in the same part of the country had agreed to put pressure 
upon third parties to insure that the plaintiff could not receive a 
cable television franchise from a local government.124 Since most of 
118. See R. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 
( 1970). While Posner believes that cable service at the local level is a natural 
monopoly, and that it is "unlikely that two or more cable companies could eco· 
nomically serve the same subscriber at once," id. at 1, the immediate cause of 
territorial exclusivity ''lies not in the economics of cable television but in the fact 
that a cable company must obtain a municipal franchise in order to be permitted 
to serve any part of the community." ld. at 4. 
119. L. JOHNSON & M. BOTEIN, CAIlLE TELEVISION: THE PROCESS OF FRANCHISING 
29·30 (1973). 
120. Report and Order, 73 F.C.C.2d 805 (1979). 
121. 47 C.F.R. § 21.901 (1979). This rule confines the frequencies for MDS to 
a 2150-2162 MHz band. This band is subdivided into channell, 2150·2156 MHz, 
and channel 2, 2156·2162 MHz, or 2A, 2156-2160 MHz. ld. 
122. See Direct Broadcast Satellites, supra note 61, at 812. 
123. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
cert. granted, 445 U.S. 914 (1980). 
124. See, e.g., Charlotte Telecasters, Inc. V. Jefferson·Pilot Corp., 546 F.2d 570 
(4th Cir. 1976); Metro Cable CO. V. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Lamb Enterprises, Inc. V. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972). 
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these cases were dismissed on procedural grounds, however, they 
do not provide any coherent principles.125 The boycott problem 
would be particularly dangerous, of course, if the boycotting group 
controlled an essential means of entry into a market-for example, 
all available DBS channels for the nation or any region. Here, the 
traditional "essential facility"126 doctrine might require them to 
share an otherwise scarce resource with potential competitors.127 
Finally, a horizontal combination might have enough "monop-
sony"128 power vis-a-vis potential sellers of programming that it 
could artificially depress prices.129 Indeed, private antitrust litigation 
against the three commercial television networks suggests that the 
networks may have exercised precisely this type of control over 
prices paid to independent producers.13o At this stage, it still is 
unclear whether the advent of cable, STY, MDS, and DBS will in-
crease the total "secular demand" for different types of television 
programming.l3l If they increase the demand, there probably is 
little danger of monopsony; if they decrease it, there would be a 
need for monitoring. 
125. See note 95 supra. 
126. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 125 (1977). 
ld. 
A firm which holds a lawful monopoly by virtue of ownership of a unique 
resource is guilty of monopolization if it exploits that resource in ways which 
exclude or disadvantage customers arbitarily or invidiously. For the purpose 
of assuring reasonable access, this rule treats scarce resource or natural ad-
vantage monopolies the way regulatory law treats a public utility. 
127. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United 
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). 
Another approach to this problem, of course, would be to regulate DBS as a 
common carrier. See notes 66-79 and accompanying text, supra; Direct Broadcast 
Satellites, supra note 61, at 850. 
128. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 91 (1974). 
ld. 
Monopoly is the term used to describe the situation where there is 
only one seller of a product, monopsony where there is only one buyer. Just 
as the seller has an incentive to limit output in order to increase his price 
and Erofits, so the buyer has an incentive to limit his purchases in order 
to reduce his input costs and thereby increase his profits. 
129. See, e.g., National Macaroni ~Hrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 
1965). 
130. Cf. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. 
Cal. 1976), vacated on grounds of primary jurisdiction, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(networks held to possess sufficient market power to dictate contents of shows 
produced by independent producers under the "family viewing hour" doctrine). 
131. R. PARK, CABLE TELEVISION AND UHF BROADCASTING 25-28 (1971). Secular 
demand refers to audience size for any particular medium, which may be increased 
by a variety of factors, including population growth and increase of personal 
income. Park finds it impossible to project confidently any particular growth rate 
for secular demand. ld. The impact of cable, STY, MDS, and DBS on the growth 
rate of secular demand for television programming is likewise uncertain. 
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D. Vertical Arrangements 
A vertical arrangement involves an attempt by a seller-usually 
of a unique or patented product or service-to impose price or other 
restraints upon buyers. These restrictions often limit a buyer's op-
tions as to the source or price of a product or service, and thus 
foreclose competing sellers' access to buyers. Unlike the usual hori-
zontal agreements as to price and territorial terms, however, some 
vertical restraints serve useful business purposes;132 as a result, not 
all vertical restraints are illegal per se under the antitrust laws. 
Several types of vertical restraints may emerge with the devel-
opment of cable, MDS, STY, and DBS, for two reasons. First, the 
new technologies require a wide range of products and services-
from program production to equipment manufacturing-in order 
to function. Second, many of the firms in these industries are verti-
cally integrated,133 thus creating an incentive to use market power 
in the one area to control a market in another area. 
Perhaps the most common type of vertical restraint-and per-
haps also the most likely to develop in these new technologies-is a 
tying agreement. A tying agreement is essentially an arrangement 
under which a seller refuses to sell a "tying" product or service 
unless the buyer also agrees to purchase another, less attractive, 
"tied" product or service.134 A tying arrangement is thus an effective 
way of utilizing dominance in one market to establish market power 
in another. 
Obviously, a tying arrangement is not effective unless the tying 
product is sufficiently necessary to a buyer-usually because of a 
patent or a unique process- to coerce a buyer into purchasing the 
tied product.135 Tying arrangements have generally been held to be 
132. See text accompanying note 141 infra. 
133. See text accompanying note 167 infra. 
134. See, e.g., International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 
131 (1936). IBM was enjoined from leasing tabulating machines upon the condition 
that the lessees use IBM's tabulating cards exclusively. ld. at 132. This tying nr-
rangement was held to be a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 14 (1970): "We rest [our decision] on the language of § 3 of the Clayton Act 
which e}..-pressly makes tying clauses unlawful, whether the machine leased is 
'patented or unpatented.''' ld. at 137. 
135. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 612 (1974). 
ld. 
The Supreme Court in tie-in cases has proceeded on the theory that 
tying agreements are a method by which a firm having a monopoly (pre-
sumably lawful) of one product ... obtains a second, distinct monopoly 
of a good used in conjunction with the first product . . . [T]he monopoly 
of the first product enables the producer to make a credible threat to 
impose substantial costs on the purchaser by refusing to sell the product 
to him unless the purchaser agrees to buy the second product as well. 
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per se violations of the antitrust laws, because they foreclose com-
peting sellers' access to buyers without any business justification.136 
At this comparatively early stage in their development, the 
economics of cable, STV, MDS, and DBS have not sorted them-
selves out sufficiently to allow very accurate predictions about tying 
arrangements. Nevertheless, there appear to be a variety of possi-
bilities. For example, sale of receiving equipment and of program 
material might be tied in any number of different ways. A manu-
facturer of a particularly useful or patented piece of receiving equip-
ment might be able to require a broadcaster or viewer to buy its 
programming as well.137 Conversely, the owner of highly attractive 
136. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 392 (1947). In this 
case the lease of patented salt machines was tied to the requirement that lessees 
purchase salt products to be used in the machines from the International Salt Com-
pany. ld. at 394-96. This activity was a per se violation of section I of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1976), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). The 
Court in International Salt Co. stated that "it is unreasonable per se, to foreclose 
competitors from any substantial market." 392 U.S. at 396. 
137. ct. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 
1960), afj'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam) (rule of reason analysis rather than 
per se rule normally applied to tying arrangements). 
The defendant, Jerrold, was a manufacturer of master antenna equipment and 
related products used to boost weak Signals in fringe areas and transmit them via 
cable to multiple television receivers. 187 F. Supp. at 549. The complaint alleged, 
inter alia, that Jerrold contracted to sell and made sales of its equipment upon 
unlawful conditions in violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (3) (1976) 
and § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1976). 187 F. Supp. at 548-49. Four 
separate tying arrangements were alleged. 
The sale of the initial system was tied to a service contract "which provided for 
technical services with respect to the layout, installation and operation of the 
system." ld. at 552. The tying of sales to service was alleged by the Government to 
be a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and unreasonable per se. Jerrold's pOSition 
as a sales leader (75% of the cable systems sold between 1950 and 1954) and the 
great demand for its equipment, due to the superiority of its design, placed Jerrold 
"in a strategic position and gave it the leverage necessary to persuade customers 
to agree to its service contracts." ld. at 555. While this leverage constituted economic 
power sufficient to invoke the per se rule, the court felt that the unique factual 
circumstances of the case made a rule of reason analysis applicable. ld. Jerrold was 
marketing an innovative and unproven technology, had limited production capacity, 
and Jerrold's success as well as that of the entire industry depended upon the 
quality of the initial systems. The service contract tie-ins of the initial Jerrold 
systems, designed to insure the quality of the product delivered to the subscribers 
thus were reasonable. "The court's conclusion is based primarily on the fact that 
the tie-in was instituted in the launching of a new business with a highly uncertain 
future." ld. at 557. The service contract tying arrangement became unreasonable, 
however, as the growth and success of the cable industry eliminated the special 
circumstances that were present at its inception. ld. at 558. 
The second tying arrangement involved Jerrold's marketing of all of its products 
as complete systems and the refusal to sell component parts for use in non-Jerrold 
systems. ld. at 558. This was alleged to be a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act. 
ld. In particular, Jerrold tied the sale of its "headend" equipment, used in the initial 
reception of the television signal, to the sale of its down-line amplifiers, used in the 
process of delivering the signal from the receiving station to the subscribers. The 
890 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 
copyrighted programming might be able to require a broadcaster or 
viewer to buy its equipment in order to receive its programming. las 
Similarly, if the number of available satellites and frequencies is as 
limited as some observers have suggested, DBS operators might 
be able to tie use of their facilities to purchase of both their receiving 
equipment and their programming.laO 
A second type of vertical restraint, closely related to tying 
arrangements, is an exclusive dealing agreement, often in the form 
of a requirements contract. Sellers of particularly attractive-and, 
once again, often patented-products sometimes are able to require 
buyers to purchase all of their supplies of a particular product or 
Jerrold headend was technologically innovative and provided the superiority of the 
Jerrold system, but was responsible for only a modest proportion of the profits. 
The down-line amplifiers, which were not technologically superior to those of 
Jerrold's competitors, provided a substantial portion of the profit to be realized from 
the sale of a cable system. This tying arrangement was found to be reasonable for 
the same reasons as the service contract arrangement, and similarly became un-
reasonable with the development and success of the industry. ld. at 560-61. 
Jerrold tied the initial sale of cable equipment to a contract provision granting it 
veto power over the subsequent incorporation of non-Jerrold equipment into the 
system. This arrangement did not unduly restrict competition and was held to be 
acceptable under the rule of reason approach employed by the court. "The veto 
provisions were necessary to protect Jerrold in view of its maintenance obligations 
under the contracts and its financial interest in the success of the systems." ld. at 562. 
Finally, the sales of the Jerrold systems were tied to the purchasers' agreement 
that all equipment necessary for the incorporation of additional channels into the 
local cable system would be purchased from Jerrold. These provisions were held to 
constitute unlawful tying in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the 
Clayton Act. The absolute prohibition of competitive equipment was unjustifiable. 
Jerrold's veto power over the use of non-Jerrold equipment prOvided it adequate 
protection as to the quality and compatability of competitive equipment to be 
added to the systems, making this absolute ban on the use of certain types of com-
petitive equipment unnecessary. Also, the circumstances justifying the first two 
tie-ins at the birth of the cable industry did not apply to the contemplated sales 
of additional equipment which might not occur, if ever, until years after the in-
stallation of the initial Jerrold systems. ld. at 562. 
138. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 
495, 505 n.2 (1969). In Fortner, the Court stated, "the proper focus of concern 
is whether the seller has the power to raise prices or impose other burdensome 
terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within 
the market." ld. at 504. After remand the case was again before the Supreme Court. 
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). In 
reversing the district court decision in favor of the customer, the Court indicated 
that "the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his 
competitors in the market for the tying product." ld. at 620. In explaining the 
relevant inquiry the Court stated, "the unique character of the tyin¥. product has 
provided critical support for the finding of illegality in prior cases.' ld. at 619. 
A patent monopoly or copyright monopoly gives rise to a presumption of economic 
power in the market for tying products. ld. 
139. Common carrier regulation of DBS would ban this type of an arrangement 
as an "unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, 
regulations facilities, or services." 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976). Thus, this legislation 
would preclude any antitrust issue regarding the arrangement. 
1980] JURISDICTION AND ANTITRUST 891 
service from them. Like tying arrangements, exclusive dealing 
agreements require that a seller have market dominance in a par-
ticular product and may be a means of expanding market domi-
nance.140 Unlike tying arrangements, however, exclusive dealing 
agreements may be viewed as being a mutual convenience for sellers 
and buyers-for example, in insuring a continuous supply of neces-
sary products or services. HI Thus, they generally are not illegal per 
se.142 
As in the situation with tying arrangements, the economics of 
cable, STV, MDS, and DBS still are not yet sufficiently developed 
and defined to pinpoint potential antitrust violations. Nevertheless, 
some speculation is possible. For example, a DBS operator might 
attempt to exploit the potential scarcity of DBS channels to require 
programmers to buy all of their DBS transmission services from it. 
The validity of this type of arrangement naturally would depend 
upon whether it represented coercion by the DBS operator or 
whether it amounted to a mutually advantageous arrangement be-
tween the DBS operator and the programmer.143 
A third type of relevant vertical restraint would be a monopo-
list's refusal to deal. This essentially involves a refusal by a seller to 
deal with a buyer if the buyer also purchases a product or service 
from one of the seller's competitors.144 Like tying arrangements and 
exclusive dealing agreements, a refusal to deal is a means of trans-
ferring market power from one area to another. It requires, how-
ever, that the seller possess not merely market dominance, but 
effective monopoly power,145 a degree of market control which often 
is difficult to prove.146 
A vertically integrated cable, STV, MDS, or DBS operator thus 
might have an incentive to prevent its customers from dealing with 
140. See text accompanying note 135 sllpra. 
141. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949). 
142. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333 (1961). 
143. Id. at 334; Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 
(1949). 
144. Boycotts involving collusive activity by competitors are also subject to 
scrutiny under the antitrust laws. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457, 461 (1941), wherein it was held that a combination (the Guild) of 
manufacturers of women's garments and manufacturers of the textiles used in making 
these garments which "purposely boycotted and declined to sell their products to 
retailers who follow a policy of selling garments copied by other manufacturers 
from designs put out by Guild members" violated § 14(3) of the Clayton Act. 
145. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (news-
paper publisher's refusal to accept advertisements from advertisers who advertised 
over competing radio station held to violate § 2 of the Sherman Act where newspaper 
publisher had substantial monopoly power in the market for dissemination of news 
and advertising). 
146. See text accompanying note 106 supra. 
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its competitors. As noted above,147 it is less than clear whether the 
relevant market would be just DBS, DBS and STY, or DBS, STY 
and a wide variety of other media. For example, a DBS operator 
might refuse to sell time to a programmer who also bought time on 
STV stations. If the market were just DBS, the DBS operator might 
have sufficient monopoly power. If the market were all video media, 
however, a DBS operator presumably would not.14S 
Finally, a seller might attempt to impose resale price mainte-
nance upon its buyers by setting minimum prices for them to sell a 
product or service. The sellers goal in this situation is either to assist 
its buyers by preventing price competition among them or to elevate 
prices in the face of comparatively inelastic demand.149 Resale price 
maintenance is a per se violation of the antitrust laws,1f;o 
At this point, it is somewhat difficult to envision situations in 
which a cable, STY, MDS, or DBS operator might have an incentive 
to impose resale price maintenance. In theory, a program producer 
might attempt to impose resale price maintenance in order to help 
cable, STY, MDS and DBS operators prevent competition, by allow-
ing them to sell its programming at approximately the same price. 
Experience to date, however, does not indicate the presence of these 
practices. As noted above, there is little price uniformity among 
cable television operators for either «basic" or «premium" services.1G1 
Moreover, cable, STV and MDS operators in the same market seem 
to charge different prices for essentially the same programming.1G2 
Nevertheless, at some point in the future these industries might 
have incentives to set minimum prices for programming and en-
courage a system of resale price maintenance by program suppliers. 
147. See text accompanying notes 92-106 supra. 
148. Indeed, evidence of substantial market power appears to be a predicate to 
a finding that a particular refusal to deal violates § 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 143 (1951); Union Leader Co~. 
v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1959), affd 
in part and rev'd in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 
(1961). 
149. See R. POSNER, supra note 135, at 234-37. 
150. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1961). Prior to 1975, the Sherman 
Act included enabling legislation which allowed the states to enact "fair trade" 
laws authorizing resale price maintenance. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This federal 
exemption was repealed in 1975. Act of December 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 
89 Stat. 801 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976». Today the per se rule is applicable 
to all agreements whereby a seller dictates the resale prices of the buyer. 
151. See text accompanying note 111 supra. 
152. Compare Paul Kagan Assocs., Inc., Census as of December 31, 1978 of Pay-
Cable Systems Operational on September 30, 1978 (1979) (unpublished estimates 
available from Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Carmel, CA) with Subscription Television, 
supra note 48 and MultipOint Distribution Service, supra note 55. 
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In addition, a supplier might come under pressure to create uniform 
prices as to other inputs-such as equipment-in the future. 
Until the economic relationships between cable, STY, MDS 
and DBS become considerably clearer, it thus is impossible to pre-
dict particular types of vertical restraints. A number of different 
trends, however, certainly are quite possible. On the one hand, the 
Commission must take these into account in establishing a new 
regulatory scheme. On the other hand, the present antitrust laws 
may be adequate to deal with these potential vertical restraints. 
E. St1'Uctural Considerations 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to "monopolize 
or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire ... to monopolize" 
interstate commerce153 and section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits 
any merger or acquisition "where in any line of commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."l54 
These are the main provisions of the antitrust laws aimed at struc-
tural considerations. In short, section 2 requires a showing of sub-
stantial market dominance and overtly anticompetitive acts by the 
defendant/55 while seotion 7 requires only a shOwing of undue con-
centration of economic power.156 
Both section 2 and section 7 thus rest upon the concept of "mo-
nopoly," which in turn requires reference to the relevant market in 
order to determine a firm's share of the market. As noted above, 
there are two relevant markets: first, a product market; and, second, 
a geographic market.157 
Under section 2, a cable system's, STY station's, MDS opera-
tion's or DBS system's market share probably would be Significantly 
below the fifty or sixty percent which appears to be a rough thresh-
old figure established by the courts.1:>8 In addition, under section 2 
153. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 
154. ld. § 18 (1976) (originally enacted as Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 
730 (1914». 
155. SULLIVA.'1, supra note 89, at 94-105. 
156. ld. at 592-99. 
157. See text accompanying notes 92-106 supra. 
158. A brief look at decisions on this point reveals that the level of the market 
share considered to constitute monopoly power is a matter of degree. There appears 
to be unanimity at high percentages. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87% share held by Grinnell and its affiliates supported an 
inference of monopoly power); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 
F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90% market share clearly monopolistic). 
However, there is some doubt and disagreement in the middle range. See, e.g., 
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 425 (1920) (50% control 
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the courtS traditionally have required a plaintiff to show not only 
that a defendant dominates a relevant market, but also that it has 
achieved its high market share through coercive, predatory, or 
otherwise anticompetitive practices.159 In general, "internal expan-
sion" by a firm is insufficient in itself to violate section 2.100 Most 
regulated firms obviously are intelligent enough today to avoid any 
overtly anticompetitive behavior. As a result, the pOSSibility of a 
section 2 violation by anyone of the new media seems remote at 
best, because they probably will lack both the market shares and 
-the anticompetitive practices. 
The scope of section 7, however, is considerably broader than 
that of section 2. There is no requirement that a defendant 
commit any coercive, predatory or otherwise anticompetitive acts; 
in theory, the only issue is whether a particular merger or acquisi-
tion would "tend to create a monopoly." As a result, the Supreme 
Court has invalidated horizontal and vertical mergers which would 
have resulted in a firm that controlled as little as 2.3 percent of a 
national product market.l6l It thus is conceivable that mergers of 
cable systems, STV stations, MDS operations or DBS systems would 
violate section 7. 
did not constitute monopoly power); Amplex of Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Murine 
Corp., 380 F.2d 112,114 (4th Cir. 1967) (60% constituted monopoly power); United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (doubtful 
whether 60% would constitute monopoly power but 33% certainly would not). 
Thus, market share is not necessarily a reliable determinant of monopoly power. 
One commentator has suggested that the use of such a specific yardsticK avoids the 
complex factors which underlie the determination of monopolistic power, including 
the very determination of the appropriate market itself. SULLIVAN, supra note 89, 
at 74-77. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,343 n.1 
(D. Mass. 1953) (while 75% market share was significant, finding of monopoly 
power was based on factors other than pure influence from market share). 
159. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
75-77 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-84 (1911). 
160. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 281 U.S. 417, 421 
(1920); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1911); 
United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 245 F. Supp. 161, 169 (1965) (quoting 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1911». How-
ever, the court in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945), while recognizing size to be a factor, stated that size alone in terms 
of aggregated capital, power or volume of business was not conclusory in establish-
ing a § 7 violation. ld. at 428-29. 
161. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1966) 
(although the merger yielded combined sales of only 4.49% of the national market, 
the Court also examined the effect achieved in the smaller, more localized markets, 
i.e., combined sales of 23.95% for the Wisconsin market and 11.32% for the tri-state 
market); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 539-54 (1962) (the 
Court indicated that one of the reasons for invalidating a merger which yielded 
apprOximately 5% of the national sales market was the effect of the combination on 
smaller city markets). 
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Since horizontal mergers or acquisitions receive stricter scrutiny 
under section 7 than vertical mergers or acquisitions,162 any attempt 
to acquire or merge with an existing competitor in the same service 
might be illegal-even if the resulting corporation had only a limited 
share of the market.163 For example, a regional DBS system might 
have only five or ten percent of the national market for pay pro-
gramming; a merger with another regional DBS system with a sim-
ilar amount of the national market, however, might give the resulting 
corporation too much control of the regional DBS market under sec-
tion 7. 
On the other hand, vertical mergers or acquisitions generally 
receive more sympathetic treatment from the courts, because they 
oftentimes do not eliminate any competition between existing firms.164 
As a result, the courts generally require a showing of fairly substan-
tial economic concentration before invalidating a vertical merger or 
acquisition.165 
For a variety of reasons, it seems reasonable to expect a high 
degree of vertical integration in cable, STV, MDS and DBS opera-
tions. Substantial economic incentives probably exist for vertical 
integration, simply because all of these media operate as buyers and 
sellers in a number of different markets simultaneously. Unlike con-
ventional television broadcasting, all four media need not only to 
buy programming and operate transmitters, but also to provide con-
verters, specialized receivers and repair service for viewers. Indeed, 
the experience to date indicates that a number of firms already have 
embarked upon vigorous programs of vertical integration. For ex-
ample, the major suppliers of pay programming are also major 
operators of cable systems.166 
This tendency is even more marked in the field of satellite com-
munications. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this is the RCA 
Corporation. RCA American Communications, Inc. owns satellites 
and earth stations which provide, inter alia, transmission of pay 
cable television programming throughout the United States. RCA 
also owns the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) as well as 
its "owned and operated" stations; and RCA manufactures television 
162. The Court has, on occasion, approved vertical acquisitions resulting in sub-
stantially larger market shares. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 
415 U.S. 786 (1974). 
163. See note 107 and accompanying text supra. 
164. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines IT 11, reprinted in [1968] 1 TRADE 
REG. REp. (CCH) If 4510. 
165. See note 169 infra. 
166. See SubSCription Television, supra note 48. 
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transmitters, television receivers and home video recorders.107 If 
RCA acquired programming and some cable television systems, it 
would have complete vertical integration from program production 
through home viewing. 
To the extent that significant vertical integration continues to 
occur in the fields of cable, STY, MDS and DBS, section 7 might be 
applicable. Assuming that a merger or acquisition gave the result-
ing corporation sufficient market power, a variety of other factors 
might show a section 7 violation. First, a vertical or "conglomerate" 
merger in these fields might create significant barriers to entry for 
potential competitors.1GS For example, a DBS operator's acquisition 
of a manufacturer of earth stations might exclude a potentially com-
petitive manufacturer because of the high capital costs of beginning 
manufacturing operations and potential consumer preferences for 
the product of an existing DBS operator. Second, if an acquiring 
:finn were an industrial giant like RCA, it might be held to have 
overly "deep pockets" to subsidize its new operations against present 
or potential competitors.169 Third, vertical integration might allow 
an acquiring firm to obtain the advantage of "reciprocal dealings," 
by encouraging its sellers to give a buying preference to an acquired 
companyPO For example, a cable television operator might be able 
167. NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM18SION. 
STRUCTURE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE PARENT CORPORATIONS OF THE MAJOR 
COMMERCIAL TELEVISION NETWORKS (preliminary draft Oct. 1979) (copy on file at 
the offices of New York Law School Law Review). 
168. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967). 
Clorox Chemical Co. was the leading manufacturer of household bleach producing 
apprOximately 48% of the national market. It essentially shared 80% of this market 
with five other firms, the remaining 20% of the market going to 200 small producers. 
rd. at 571. The FTC found that when the defendant, a major manufacturer of 
household products, acquired Clorox it might have substantially lessened competition 
in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act. The basis for the FTC's conclusion was that 
defendant's "huge assets and advertising advantages ... would dissuade new en-
trants and discourage active competition from the fIrms already in the industry due 
to fear of retaliation by [the defendant]." rd. at 572-75. 
169. See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 
1962). In this case, the court noted that Reynolds was the largest producer of 
aluminum foll and that it was one of many manufacturers of foll who sold large 
quantities to intermediaries known in the trade as "converters." rd. at 225. These 
converters colored and decorated the foll for specialty users (e.g., florists, candy 
manufacturers, etc.). One of these converters, Arrow Brands, Inc., was acquired by 
Reynolds, but the FTC found, with the court of appeals affirming. that such a com-
bination would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. One of the primary considerations in 
fInding a violation was the enormous fInancial support that Reynolds could prOVide 
Arrow. With such support from the "rich :earent," Arrow would have the ability 
to sell its products below cost and thereby 'undercut and ravage the less aHluent 
competition." Id. at 229-30. 
170. See, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). The 
defendant was a substantial purchaser of products from food processors, who in 
tum used dehydrated spices in the preparation of their products. When the de-
1980] JURISDICTION AND ANTITRUST 897 
to apply pressure to a satellite common carrier to buy earth station 
equipment from the cable operator's manufacturing subSidiary. 
Finally, vertical integration naturally increases the risk that a finn 
will be able to «capture" a customer which otherwise might have 
done business with a competitor.17l Vertically integrated cable tele-
vision companies thus might require their operating systems to take 
their premium service only from their programming subsidiaries.172 
As a result, section 2 and section 7 clearly have a role to play 
in regulating the conduct of cable, STY, MDS and DBS. Indeed, the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that 
the Commission was required to consider the potential anticompeti-
tive aspects of any merger which it approved under Title II of the 
Communications Act.173 
F. Primary Jurisdiction Under the Antitrust Laws 
In analyzing the potential applicability of the antitrust laws to 
these new media, the final question is the extent to which either 
private parties or the Justice Department would be required to liti-
gate their claims before the Commission rather than the courts. 
Traditional doctrines of exclusive jurisdiction, agency immunization, 
or primary jurisdiction could, arguably, bar access to the courts. As 
indicated below, however, it is difficult to predict the application 
of these doctrines. To a very real extent, there are as many theories 
of jurisdiction as there are commentators.174 
"Primary" jurisdiction, in a broad sense, seems to include at 
least three major sub-doctrines: exclusive jurisdiction, primary juris-
diction and agency immunization. When exclusive jurisdiction over 
a matter is conferred upon a regulatory agency such as the FCC, 
the courts are left with no jurisdiction in the particular area-except 
for a limited amount of judicial review of the agency's judgments 
in certain situations.m; On the other hand, primary jurisdiction gives 
fendant acquired a manufacturer of such spices, the potential for creating reciprocal 
agreements became significant. ld. at 595-600. 
171. See United States v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
In this case, DuPont, one of a few manufacturers of auto paint, purchased a sizeable 
percentage of stock in General Motors Corp. The Court found that DuPont used its 
ownership of GM shares to insure that the automaker filled its paint requirements 
from DuPont. ld. at 606. 
172. Recent Trends in Cable Television, supra note 18, at 30-32. 
173. United States v. FCC, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 59 (1978). 
174. See generally Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency 
Interaction,29 RUTGERS L. REV. 867 (1976). 
175. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). A reviewing 
court may set aside an agency decision when the court cannot conscientiously find 
that the evidence supporting the decision is substantial, when viewing the record in 
its entirety. ld. at 488. 
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the agency an initial opportunity to consider a legal issue or to find 
facts, but reserves for a court the ultimate power to render a judg-
ment. Agency immunization, in the antitrust context, is the power 
of a regulatory agency to exempt an entire industry from being sub-
ject to antitrust laws. Thus, agency immunization is even more abso-
lute a power than the agency's exercise of exclusive jurisdiction, as 
the entire scope of the exemption may be determined by the agency. 
For example, a cable, STV, MDS, or DBS operator might have 
an incentive to tie programming to use of its receiving equipment. 
If the programming were attractive enough, this type of arrange-
ment would be a per se violation of the antitrust laws.17G Neverthe-
less, the only remedy might be before the Commission rather than 
the courts, on a theory of exclusive jurisdiction, primary jurisdiction, 
or agency immunization. 
1. An Overview of the Doctrines 
The original statement of exclusive jurisdiction came in the 
context of protecting ICC tariffs from scattergun collateral attacks 
in state courts.1i7 Primary exclusive jurisdiction thus developed for 
purposes far different from its most common application today as a 
defense in an antitrust action. 
The putative parent of the doctrine is Texas & Pacific Railway 
v. Abilene Cotton Oil CO.,178 where the Court held that a shipper 
could not sue in state court .to recover overcharges from a railroad, 
but instead had to commence a proceeding before the ICC. The 
Court reasoned that individual recoveries would permit de facto 
rebates to some shippers and encourage collusive lawsuits to give 
rebates, thus creating a lack of "uniformity" in rates.179 
The easiest cases of agency immunization, naturally, are those 
in which ,the status of an agency's immunization power is clear. 
When a court finds that an agency could not conceivably immunize 
a violation of the antitrust laws, the court need not consider whether 
the agency must pass on the conduct.1so Conversely, many industries 
operate under express statutory exemptions from the antitrust 
laws.1s1 The existence of an exemption thus creates a legal situation 
176. See text accompanying note 136 supra. 
177. See note 178 and accompanying text infra. 
178. 204 U.S. 426 (1907). 
179. Id. at 440-46. 
180. See, e.g., Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 
362 U.S. 458, 461-64 (1960). 
181. For a comprehensive list of industries operating under express statutory 
exemption from the antitrust laws, see Walden, A1ltitrust in the Positive State, 41 
TEXAS L. REv. 741, 767-88 app. (1963). 
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very similar to exclusive jurisdiction; the jurisdiction of the courts 
is effectively destroyed and all control of the industry is vested in an 
agency.182 The situation becomes infinitely more complicated, how-
ever, where the scope of an exemption is unclear. A decision in 
favor of immunization power has a powerful impact upon the par-
ties to a lawsuit. Immunization may effectively destroy a plaintiff's 
cause of action. If it has the requisite power, the agency often will 
immunize the conduct, and the courts have long recognized the 
outcome-determinative effect of agency immunization.183 
Primary jurisdiction in the most narrow sense exists only where 
there is concurrent jurisdiction between a court and an agency. In 
this situation, the question is which tribunal will proceed first, rather 
than which tribunal will proceed.184 To be sure, primary jurisdiction 
has some impact upon the outcome of a case; after all, if an agency 
uses its "expertise" to find facts, review under the substantial evi-
dence rule will restrict the reviewing court's role greatly.185 In an 
exclusive jurisdiction situation, the court's only role is to subject the 
agency decision to very limited substantive review; in a primary 
jurisdiction situation, the court retains jurisdiction over the case and 
uses the agency decision as just one component in its own deci-
sion.lso The plaintiff thus retains its right to a judicial remedy, sub-
ject only to a pOSSibly binding decision from the relevant agency.1S7 
182. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c)(1) (1968) (upon FCC approval 
of telephone and telegraph carrier consolidation or merger, the laws making them 
unlawful shall not apply). For further e.xamples of statutes which exempt industries 
regulated by administrative agencies from the antitrust laws see Note, Antitrust 
Immunittj in the Communications Industries, 44 VA. L. REV. 1131, n.1 (1958). 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
Here the Court recognized "that the practical effect of applying the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction has sometimes been to channel judicial enforcement of anti-
trust policy into appellate review of the agency's decision or even to preclude 
such enforcement entirely." Id. at 353-54 (citation omitted). 
184. See von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doc-
trine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV. L. REV. 929, 931-32 (1954). 
185. See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). In 
Far East Conference the Court said: 
[A] principle, now firmly established, [is] that in cases raising issues of fact 
not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the 
exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulat-
ing the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though 
the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as 
a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. 
Id. at 574. 
186. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago ~Iercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). In 
Ricci, the Court said that "where the regulating regime is administered by an agency, 
the antitrust court will stay its hand to permit institution of administrative proceed-
ings if they are 1ikely to make a meaningful contribution to the resolution of this 
law suit.''' Id. at 306. 
187. Id. at 307-08. The Ricci Court said that "if it is found that the [agency] 
has merely followed and enforced its own rules, the antitrust court will be in a 
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2. Application of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrines to Cable, STY, 
MDS and DBS 
Application of the primary jurisdiction doctrines thus depends 
to a very real extent upon the type of regulatory scheme which an 
agency imposes upon a firm. As noted above, Congress' intent to 
vest primary or exclusive jurisdiction in an agency is highly deter-
minative.ISS The Commission has available to it a variety of present 
or potential jurisdictional bases for cable, STY, MDS and DBS.ISO 
The result is that a different doctrine of primary jurisdiction may 
apply to each medium. As noted above, cable, STY, MDS or DBS 
operators might have an incentive to tie sales of programming to use 
of receiving equipment.loo The same type of action under the same 
antitrust theory thus might or might not fall within the Commis-
sion's primary or exclusive jurisdiction. 
For example, an antitrust suit against a cable television opera-
tor for tying "premium" service to use of its converter probably 
would not be subject to any primary jurisdiction doctrine, since the 
Commission imposes an increasingly limited scope of regulation 
upon cable television. The Commission apparently lacks any type of 
"pervasive regulatory scheme" sufficient to give it exclusive jurisdic-
tion;I91 it seems doubtful even whether the Commission has enough 
"expertise" in the area to require a "referral."ID2 In the event that 
the Commission did impose very specific requirements, of course, it 
might have either primary or exclusive jurisdiction; if such close 
regulation existed, an agreement by a number of cable operators 
position to make a more intelligent and sensitive judgment as to whether the anti-
trust laws will punish what an apparently valid nile of the [agency] permits." ld. 
188. See text accompanying note 180 supra. 
189. See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra. 
190. See text accompanying note 176 supra. 
191. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 350 (1959). 
This case arose when the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) received FCC 
approval for an exchange of its Cleveland television station for one owned by the 
Westinghouse Broadcasting Company in Philadelphia. The Government, alleging a 
conspiracy on the part of RCA to acquire stations in five of the eight largest marKet 
areas, brought suit pursuant to the antitrust laws. ld. at 335-36. RCA contended 
that FCC approval of the exchange barred an independent action by the Govern-
ment challenging it under the antitrust laws. ld. The Supreme Court, holding that 
with regard to television broadcasters the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not 
apply, rejected RCA's contention. ld. at 350. 
192. ld. at 350 n.18. Here the Court, referring to a memorandum written by 
the FCC disavowing either the power or the desire to foreclose the Government 
from antitrust actions, said: "Since, as Mr. Justice Brandeis observed the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction rests in part upon the need for the skill of a 'body of experts: 
it would be odd to impose the doctrine when the experts deny the relevance of their 
skill." ld. 
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not to carry a particular station's signal as required by the Commis-
sion103 might invoke primary jurisdiction or a referral. 
Although there appears to be an informal practice in some state 
courts of contacting the Commission for general advice about litiga-
tion involving cable television systems,194 this would not require a 
prohibition on proceedings in a federal district court. Indeed, to the 
extent that any type of primary jurisdiction over cable television 
exists at all, it may rest with the state agencies which regulate cable 
systems on a fairly close basis. At least some lower federal courts 
have chosen in antitrust cases to defer to state regulatory commis-
sions as a matter of discretion, in order to benefit from their day-to-
day dealings with regulated firmS.195 
It is less clear whether the Commission would have primary or 
exclusive jurisdiction over STY in an action involving this type of 
tying agreement. The Commission and the courts have viewed STV 
as a type of broadcasting under Title III of the Act;196 and the 
Court has held that no primary or exclusive jurisdiction generally 
exists as to broadcast stations under Title III, since the Commission 
does not exercise "pervasive" jurisdiction over them. In United States 
v. Radio Corp. of America,197 the Court refused to apply a doctrine 
of primary or exclusive jurisdiction to defeat a Justice Department 
action for an injunction against NBC's acquisition of an additional 
television station.198 The Court distinguished cases involving com-
mon carriers, noting that "there being no pervasive regulatory 
scheme, and no rate structures to throw out of balance, sporadic 
action by federal courts can work no mischief. The justification for 
primary jurisdiction accordingly disappears."199 Unless the Commis-
sion chose or was compelled to regulate STY and its rates more 
closely, there would appear to be no jurisdictional bar to an antitrust 
action in a federal district court.200 In a situation such as litigation 
over an STY operator's tying arrangement, the Commission particu-
193. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.55-76.63 (1979). 
194. Interview with members of the Office of General Counsel, FCC, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Oct. 21, 1974). 
195. See, e.g., Industrial Communications Syss., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 
505 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1974). The court said: "In the present case, the PUC's 
[California Public Utilities Commission] review of the nature of the market, the 
quality of present radiotelephone utility service, the competitive inlpact of defen-
dant's entry into the market, and various other issues would be an invaluable aid to 
the district court." Id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
196. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra. 
197. 358 U.S. 334 (1959). See note 191 and accompanying text supra. 
198. 358 U.S. at 346-52. 
199. Id. at 350. 
200. See tat accompanying notes 48-54 supra. 
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larly would seem to lack primary or exclusive jurisdiction, due to 
the fact that it has chosen not to regulate ownership of STY de-
coders. 
A lawsuit against an MDS operator for a tying arrangement 
might invoke primary or exclusive jurisdiction, however, because 
the Commission regulates MDS as a common carrier.201 As noted 
above, the basic doctrine of primary jurisdiction arose in the context 
of common carrier regulation and the Court's concern for maintain-
ing uniform federal regulation.202 In general, the Court has held 
that Congress made a deliberate decision in favor of regulation and 
against competition in the field of common carriers. In FCC v. RCA 
Communications, Inc.,203 the Court held that the Commission had 
erred in authorizing a new international wire service solely to in-
crease competition.204 The Court noted that antitrust considerations 
were not controlling on the Commission's regulation of common 
carriers,205 stating: 
The very fact that Congress has seen fit to enter into the 
comprehensive regulation of communications embodied 
in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 contradicts 
the notion that national policy unqualifiably favors com-
petition in communications. . . . Whatever the reasons, 
they are not for us to weigh; it is for us to recognize that 
encouragement of competition as such has not been con-
sidered the single or controlling reliance on safeguarding 
the public interest.20G 
Since this decision and the general trend of litigation in the trans-
portation or common carrier industries tends to focus mainly upon 
rate regulation, it may be possible to argue that agency immuniza-
tion and exclusive jurisdiction do not apply to MDS, since the Com-
mission does not regulate its rates; the weight of this argument, 
however is unclear. To the extent that an action involves conduct 
which the Commission does not regulate under an MDS tariff, how-
ever, exclusive jurisdiction or immunity might not exist;207 the rele-
vant conduct might be viewed as falling solely within the Commis-
201. 47 C.F.R. § 21.900 (1978). See also Report and Order, 29 HAD. REo. 2d 
(P&F) 382 (1974). 
202. See text accompanying note 179 supra. 
203. 346 U.S. 86 (1953). 
204. ld. at 95. 
205. ld. at 93. 
206. ld. 
207. See, e.g., Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., [1979] 2 Trade Cns. 
IT 62,974 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 28, 1979). 
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sion's general Title III jurisdiction over uses of the over-the-air radio 
spectrum.208 
Finally, the status of DBS will remain unclear until the DBS 
industry develops and its economic as well as regulatory characteris-
tics become visible. The Commission probably has discretion to 
regulate DBS as a broadcaster, common carrier or combination 
thereof.20o If it opts for loose regulation, presumably there would 
be no primary or exclusive jurisdiction to bar an antitrust suit against 
a DBS system. On the other hand, if it opts for close regulation 
through tariffs, there could be a substantial argument for primary 
or exclusive jurisdiction as to matters covered by a tariff. 
The upshot of the prior discussion is simply that the Commis-
sion largely controls its own destiny in this area. It can structure its 
regulations either to encourage or discourage antitrust suits brought 
by private parties or the Justice Department. As the Court has noted 
time and time again,210 the antitrust and regulatory regimes are often 
mutually exclusive. At this still comparatively early stage in the 
regulation of cable, STV, MDS and DBS, the Commission should 
thus give some consideration to which regime it wishes to have 
govern. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The potential exists for many types of anticompetitive behavior 
by cable, STV, MDS and DBS operators. To a large extent, tradi-
tional antitrust enforcement mechanisms will police these practices. 
The Commission thus can leave consideration of many of the pre-
Viously discussed anticompetitive practices to litigation brought by 
private parties, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission. If the Commission decides to rely upon traditional 
antitrust litigation, however, it should be careful to structure its 
regulations in order not to bar access to the federal courts under 
theories of primary jurisdiction. 
208. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See text accompanying notes 2-8 supra. 
209. See text accompanying notes 63-83 supra. 
210. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); 
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); McLean Trucking 
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); National Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1942). 

